REGIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA: SOME INSIGHTS ON ASIAN REGIONALISM

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1.   Introduction

Asia's regional security landscape has been characterised by a number of regional frameworks representing a panoply of security approaches adopted by states to respond to a host of security challenges.   These security frameworks range from bilateral alliances to multilateral security frameworks, some institutionalised and others ad hoc.   The often incoherent yet competing security arrangements confound security analysts who may try to provide a taxonomy of security arrangements found in Asia which vary in size, composition and modalities.

To be sure, as the region's institutional architecture continues to evolve, so does the nature of emerging security frameworks.   The confusion however not only stems from the variety of security frameworks that had emerged, but more importantly in the way these trends had also led to a slew of terms in the attempt to explain them.   As a consequence, we now have a number terms to choose from in describing their different shapes and forms—forums, processes,[1] frameworks, arrangements, structures, and organizations.   For the purpose of this study, however, I shall refer to all these security arrangements as **institution(s)** that denote an implicit or explicit structure which determines how states will act within a system.   Robert Keohane defined institutions as the "persistent and connected set of rules (formal and informal) that prescribes behavioural roles, constrain activities, and shape expectations".[2]

Using this broad definition of institutions is deemed more apt in the Asian context particularly when one examines two key security institutions in the region: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).   One notes at the outset that unlike security institutions in Europe, ASEAN and the ARF are loose security arrangements that do not have the European equivalent of a defence alliance arrangement like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to ensure security.   Instead, these two institutions rely mainly on promoting a normative framework for inter-state conduct, with minimal bureaucratic structures and less emphasis on legalistic and binding commitments.[3] Aside from this loose institutional structure, these regional security institutions particularly the ARF, with its multilateral feature—extended membership that cover a vast geographical footprint enveloping much of the wider Asia and Pacific region—present different security dynamics that constantly navigate tensions between the desire by a group of small and medium powers that aim to maintain sub-regional autonomy and leadership, and attempts by certain major powers to play a more active role.   How the institutional design fits with the demands and pressures to make both the ASEAN and the ARF more dynamic and

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[1] This term was suggested by an ASEAN official during an interview at the ASEAN Secretariat, 21 August 2009.

[2] Robert Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power, Essays in International Relations Theory*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. Institutions are often termed as regimes, defined as a set of explicit or implicit "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue-area", in Stephen Krasner (ed.) International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.

[3] Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building: From the 'ASEAN Way' to the 'Asia-Pacific Way?'" Pacific Review, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 319-46.

responsive to address pressing security challenges, as well as become more relevant against the emergence of other sub-regional security institutions, make for an interesting study of the nature of security institutions in Asia.

More importantly, the security dynamics in Asia present a more complex picture of the kind of regional order within which these security institutions operate. How regional states respond to their security environment, either through confrontation or cooperation, have been and will be largely shaped by their ability to construct effective multilateral institutions for cooperation and/or integration. Over the years since the post-Cold War era and the turn to multilateralism in Asia, the assessment of security institutions has been mixed. Security analysts with a realist lens tend to downplay the importance of institutions and argue that the overlay of balance of power politics lead states to either "initiate or manipulate institutions".[4] On the other hand, those who come from a liberal institutionalist and constructivist perspective have argued that security institutions in Asia—particularly ASEAN and the ARF –have succeeded in putting in place a set of norms, albeit rudimentary, that has defined inter-state conduct in the region and has to a large extent shaped state behaviour for the better. These broad norms include: Respect for the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, prohibition of the use of force, and commitment to pacific settlement of disputes. These legal-rational norms are encapsulated in the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of which most states that participate in one way or other to multilateral security cooperation are signatories to the Treaty. Apart from these legal-rational norms are also the so-called social-cultural norms, reputed to be particular to Southeast Asia and are oftentimes referred to as "the ASEAN way".[5] They focus on the processes of consultation and consensus-building, non-confrontation, stressing informality and organisational minimalism, and inclusiveness. The normative framework defined by the TAC and the elements of the ASEAN Way were later on adopted as the guiding operating procedures for the ARF.

The divergent perspectives on the role of multilateral security institutions in Asia would inevitably influence the assessment of their effectiveness in addressing a host of security challenges in the region, both the traditional and non-traditional. But while debates will continue over the relevance of institutions, it is interesting to note the significant increase in the number of new security institutions in the region over the last decade. Included among these are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Six-Party Talks, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD). While some of these new institutions are more ad hoc, there is nonetheless a growing sense in Asia that as security challenges become more transnational in nature, there will be greater interest in the formation of "ad hoc minilaterals" that focus on specific, mutually shared problems.[6]

Against this background, the objectives of this paper are to map the evolving regional security institutions found in Asia and to examine whether they contribute to regional peace and stability. Key to assessing the efficacy of these frameworks would be an

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4 For a more recent, comprehensive debate on the merits of multilateralism in Asia, see Michael J. Green and Bates Gill (eds.) Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community: Asia's New Multilateralism, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

5For examples on several works that explain the "ASEAN Way", see Hong Anh Tuan, "ASEAN Dispute Management: Implication for Vietnam and An Expanded ASEAN", Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 18, no. 1, June 1996; Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement: The ASEAN Experience", Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 20, no. 1, April 1998; Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, London and New York: Routledge, 2001; and Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture, London and New York: Routledge, 2003.

6 Michael Green and Bates Gill, op. cit., p. 12.

analysis not only of their security agenda and areas of cooperation, but also the nature of their institutional design in making effective decisions and ability to respond to regional security challenges. In understanding the nature of security institutions found Asia, I argue that one must bring into the analysis four factors that help explain the evolution of these institutions, as well as provide us with insights on the possible trajectory of their paths/developments in the future. These four inter-related factors are:

- Visions of regional order;
- Approaches to regional peace and security;
- Issues of institutional complementarity and/or competition; and
- Regional identity and the notion of an Asian security community.

Following the introduction, the paper therefore proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background of the regional milieu from which ASEAN and the ARF had emerged. In this section, the two factors mentioned above on evolving regional order and regional security approaches are woven into each of the respective discussions on ASEAN and the ARF. Section 2 then is divided into two parts. Section 3 examines the issue of institutional complementarity and/or competition as other security institutions like the SCO, and Six–Party Talks are included in the analysis. This section also examines the extent to which the emergence of these other regional security institutions (RSIs) has raised as many problems as it has addressed, given the multiplicity and potential competition of multilateral institutions. Section 4 then moves on to assess the notion of building an Asian security community against the plethora of regional security institutions that have emerged, including the non-official types. This section also explores the institutional linkages and various paths to promoting cooperative security in Asia. And finally, section 5 provides a summary of discussion and highlights key insights from studying RSIs on Asian regionalism. It concludes with some thoughts on the evolving contours of regional security cooperation and the prospects of an Asian security community.

2.   Vision and Approaches to Regional Security Order: Insights from ASEAN and the ARF as Regional Security Institutions

In post Cold-War Asia, the debates on regional order reflect the so-called paradigmatic divide that often preoccupies international relations scholars. As succinctly described by a renowned Asian scholar, Muthiah Alagappa, the evolving regional order has been "somewhere between a balance of power on one hand, and a regional community with the relevant institutional and normative attribute on the other".[7] From this viewpoint, states' behaviour straddle between power balancing strategies through memberships in alliances and the building of security cooperation regimes through the promotion of multilateral security frameworks. On the question as to which of the two strategies is the preferred one in Asia, the storylines of ASEAN and the ARF as discussed in the next section indicate that the latter appears to be the strategy of choice, at least from the discourses gleaned from the region. The building of security cooperative regimes, translated into the policies of engagement rather than containment, inclusiveness rather than exclusivity, and promoting trust and confidence building are best seen as more realistic modalities that small and weak states can advance as they deal with their security environment that is in a constant state of flux.

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[7] Muthiah Alagappa, (ed), *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*, (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

At the outset, it is important to explain here why ASEAN and the ARF take up much of the discussion on regional security institutions (RSIs) in Asia. There are at least three reasons for this: firstly, ASEAN has been the longest RSI in Asia. Secondly, it was also ASEAN that initiated the founding of the ARF. Several other ASEAN-led institutions followed soon after ARF's creation: the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM - 1996), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT - 1997), and the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005. Thirdly, the ARF's evolution as Asia's first experiment with multilateral security institutions presents interesting insights on the dynamic interaction between the ideational (norms, ideas, identity) and the material factors (power, territory, wealth) that states pursue to manage regional order, and the extent to which these interactions are found in other fledgling RSIs.

2.1 ASEAN and Regional Security Cooperation

Using ASEAN as a case study for regional security institution may raise questions with regard to its classification as a security institution. After all, the 1967 Bangkok Declaration – the political document that announced the formation of ASEAN—had declared that its objectives were "to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region..."[8] However, what is often missed is the other equally important objective of ASEAN (also cited in the Bangkok Declaration) which was "to promote regional peace and stability..."

In fact, many of the earlier studies on ASEAN had highlighted the main motivation behind the establishment of a regional association for Southeast Asia. In a regional milieu once characterised by intra-mural dispute, regional reconciliation was ASEAN's_its *raison d'être*.[9] Forming ASEAN had allowed member states to have a regional framework for building a stable structure of relations to contain and manage intra-mural tensions. These bilateral tensions included the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia over the formation of the Federation of Malaysia and resulted in the *Konfrontasi* in 1963, and the conflict between Malaysia and the Philippines that disputed the territory of Sabah.[10] To ASEAN's founding members, regional reconciliation was essential to attain regional security order. But undergirding a stable regional order was also the shared understanding of the need to guarantee the national security of respective member states. To this end, member states had to build their own (national) resilience by ensuring their national security and which would in turn result in the building of regional resilience to ensure regional security. [11] Thus, ASEAN had, for all intents and purposes, become a diplomatic device—a mechanism— for managing regional conflict and promote regional reconciliation for regional peace and security in Southeast Asia. In describing what the grouping was in its first decade, the late "Aseanist", Michael Leifer, had described ASEAN as a "security organisation without the

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[8] The Bangkok Declaration, 8 August 1967. Available at <http://www.asean.sec.org/1629.htm>.

[9] The five original members of ASEAN were Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined the grouping in 1984, followed by Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999.

[10] These major conflicts were in fact stumbling blocks to earlier efforts to form a regional association and became the major reasons why the first two attempts to establish the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961 and MAPHILINDO in 1963 failed. For accounts on earlier attempts to form a sub-regional organisation in Southeast Asia, see for example, Arfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organisation and Order in Southeast Asia*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982; Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia*, London: Routledge, 1989; and Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1990.

[11] For an excellent account of ASEAN's concept of comprehensive security, see Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries", in Robert A. Scalapino, et al. (eds.) *Asian Security Issues Regional and Global*, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1998, pp. 50-78.

structure of an alliance".[12]   This, to Leifer, was the paradox of ASEAN since the underlying concerns of its members at the time of its founding were more to do with the intra-regional disputes than the changes in the balance of external influences bearing on the region.

Since regional reconciliation has been ASEAN's *raison d'être*, its security approaches and practices were also defined by this orientation.   As seen over its 42-year history, the process of "regional reconciliation" was extended beyond the boundaries of the original, non-communist member states when ASEAN expanded to include other states in the region regardless of their political orientation.[13]   The unstated objective was to build a kind of a security community founded on the assumption that no member state would ever go to war with another.

Security from Within?

ASEAN's vision of a regional order was and is still closely linked with its concept of security. Since its inception, ASEAN has always emphasised the notion of comprehensive security, a concept that found many iterations in several ASEAN documents.   Briefly, comprehensive security includes the following characteristics:

- Security of all the fundamental needs and vital interests of man, society, and state, be they political, social, economic, cultural, environmental, personal or physical in nature.   This will result in national resilience and national security.
- Mutuality and interdependence of all dimensions of security.
- Encompass both the domestic and external environment.

Among ASEAN members, at least three states—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore—have developed their own versions of comprehensive security.   Indonesia' notion of comprehensive security has been expressed in the idea of *Ketahanan National* (national resilience) which became its national security doctrine as far back as during the New Order regime.   The means through which resilience was to be attained was through a multi-pronged approach covering "ideological, political, economic, political, socio-cultural, and security-cum-defence policies" with particular attention given to economic development. [14] Malaysia's concept was very much similar to Indonesia's.   Malaysia's doctrine of comprehensive security denotes that security can only be attained through a multi-dimensional approach "traversing political, socio-cultural, psychological and economic dimensions".[15] Singapore, on the other hand, has pursued a comprehensive approach to its security through the concept of "Total Defence" which covers five constituent elements: "Psychological, social, economic, civil and military defence".[16]   Similar themes are also found in the security policies of Brunei, the Philippines and Thailand.

Comprehensive security therefore became the organising security concept in the region.   As noted by Alagappa, regardless of the labels and the various interpretations of

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[12] Michael Leifer, "The Paradox of ASEAN: A Security Organisation without the Structure of an Alliance", The Round Table, no. 27, July 1978, pp. 261-8.   Reprinted in *The 2nd ASEAN Reader*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 265-8.
[13] Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and finally Cambodia in 1999.
[14] For an excellent account of the ASEAN's concept of comprehensive security, see Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries", Research Paper and Policy Studies, No. 26, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkely, n.d.
[15] Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security", p. 67.
[16] Ibid., p. 261.

the term, comprehensive security implied that security "goes beyond (but does not exclude) the military to embrace the political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions".[17]

Approaches to Security

From the discussions above, it follows that since security has been regarded in a comprehensive manner, the approaches to attain security also had to be comprehensive. These two were not mutually exclusive. To be sure, the approaches were not simply confined or limited to military security. Concomitant with the strong non-military orientation was also the emphasis on regime stability or political survival critical to national and regional resilience, as well as the importance of promoting regional economic cooperation and the building of ties with like and non-like minded states by fostering trust and confidence-building through institutionalised habits of dialogue.

The emphasis on economic development for national security and as a crucial element for national/regional resilience cannot be understated. As noted above, the importance of economic development was highlighted in the Bangkok Declaration. It is not therefore surprising that many security analysts working on ASEAN have consistently cited economic development as an essential approach to regional security. In fact, the evolving notions of regional security defined within the rubrics of comprehensive security, cooperative security and human security have always included economic development as a crucial factor in the way security is conceptualised in Asia.[18]

But while national and regional resilience were paramount, engaging major powers and building ties with potential enemies through confidence building measures (CBMs) were also considered critical for regional security. This was an integral in ASEAN's vision of a regional order and reflected in ASEAN's 1971 Declaration of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Conscious of the dynamics of great power competition during the early years of its inception, ASEAN's ZOPFAN committed its members to non-participation and impartiality in conflicts between other states, especially extra-regional states. It also called on external powers not to interfere in the domestic and regional affairs of the neutral states."[19] This was articulated most explicitly in the statement "...the right of every state, large or small, to lead its national existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs..."[20]

Indeed, a close look at ZOPFAN would reveal that while the term "neutrality" was used in the document, this was more a declaration of intent given the presence during that time of foreign military bases in the Philippines and Thailand. Although aspirational, ZOPFAN nonetheless makes no allowance to the idea that the great powers have any effective role to play in the region. Instead, it strongly implies that the great powers should respect the sovereignty of ASEAN states. Thus, ZOPFAN was essentially about reducing the role of the great powers in the region, regional autonomy and "regional solutions for regional problems".

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[17] Muthiah Alagappa, *Asian Security Practices: Material and Ideational Influences* , (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 624.

[18] Muthiah Alagappa, op.cit. See also Amitav Acharya, "Human Security: What Kind for the Asia-Pacific" and Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Human Security in the Asia-Pacific: Current Trends and Prospects", in *The Human Face of Security: Asia-Pacific Perspectives*, David Dickens (ed.) Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 144, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2002.

[19] For a more extensive discussion of this concept, see Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991, particularly p. 51.

[20] See the *Kuala Lumpur Document on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality*, 27 November 1971.

From the above, it comes as no surprise that ASEAN's security approaches when compared with the dominant security approaches were often regarded as aberrations. ASEAN took a different path in crafting its regional security approaches by eschewing any form of defence arrangement in the region.[21]   Thus, instead of adopting the conventional strategies of deterrence, power-balancing and alliance building, ASEAN's security approaches are remarkably low-key, in the sense that they emphasise the cultivation of habits of dialogue, observance of regional norms, and building of informal institutions to support these process-oriented approaches to preventing regional conflicts and maintaining regional security.   The building of norms had been enshrined in the ASEAN Way, and adoption of the 1976 TAC which codified the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, peaceful settlement of disputes, renunciation of threat or use of force, and effective cooperation among members.

It should be noted, however, that aside from the "soft", informal approaches to regional security, ASEAN does have a thick web of security arrangements, mostly bilateral with some expanded to include other regional members.   The most common bilateral agreements are between neighbouring states.   These would include Joint Border Commissions between Malaysia and Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, and Thailand and Myanmar.   Bilateral security arrangements can be in highly specialised areas such as irregular immigration or smuggling.   There are also joint bilateral military training arrangements called "defence spider web" which begun as early as in the 1970s involving intensive programmes of joint exercises, participation in each others' training programmes and provision of training facilities to one another.[22]   (See Appendix 1). These exercises have also included some form of intelligence sharing and joint exercises especially focused on maritime and air-space concerns.

The bilateral "defence spider web" has provided solid bases for intra-regional security cooperation.   Among these are: Quadrilateral cooperation among the countries in the Golden Triangle comprising Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and China, which sets out joint efforts in the control of chemicals and precursors used in manufacturing drugs, narcotic crop substitution, law enforcement cooperation and training; and cooperation among ASEAN Chiefs of Police (ASEANPOL) which has, since 1981, become a regional body to fight transnational crime, including terrorism.   In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack in the United States, ASEAN members stepped up cooperation in fighting terrorism with the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Fight Terrorism as one of its key initiatives (see Appendix 2).

In sum, through a number of declarations, agreements and treaties, ASEAN has provided a comprehensive framework for managing inter-state relations and promoting closer political and security cooperation.   The relative peace that has prevailed in Southeast Asia over the last 40 years has earned ASEAN the reputation as one of the more successful regional security organisations in the world.   It has also been referred to as a *de facto* security community in the Deutchian sense, which defines security community as: "A group that has become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong

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[21] ASEAN as a regional grouping has however allowed member states like the Philippines and Thailand to continue with their own bilateral defence arrangements with the United States which existed even before ASEAN was established in 1967.

[22] Malcolm Chalmers, *Confidence-Building in Southeast Asia*, Bradford Arms Register Studies, No. 6, Bradford, United Kingdom: Redwood Books, Trowbridge, Wiltshire, 1996, pp. 28-31. See also Amitav Acharya, *A New Regional Order in Southeast Asia: ASEAN in the Post Cold War Era*, Adelphi Paper 279, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993.

and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with 'reasonable' certainty over a 'long' period of time."[23]

ASEAN's success, however, was severely tested in the mid-1990s as the region went through a series of crises quite different from those that occurred at the time of ASEAN's inception. The conservative path chosen by ASEAN of maintaining good neighbourly relations through norm-building was woefully inadequate to respond to trans-border problems such as 1997-98 financial meltdowns, environmental disasters, humanitarian crises (East Timor in 1999), terrorism and highly infectious epidemics. Clearly, the kinds of crises and challenges that confronted the region required much more than what a loosely-structured organisation could provide. As the region found itself beset with a number of crises, ASEAN was roundly criticised for being ineffective and irrelevant. Many analysts decried the prevalence of regional norms which were seen as obstructive to effective regional action. At its worst time, ASEAN was also dismissed by its critics as a sunset organisation.[24]

ASEAN Political and Security Community: Advancing Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia

With increasing realisation that much more needs to be done in ensuring regional security, the nature of defence and security cooperation in Southeast Asia saw a number of significant developments. So far, one of the most important initiatives in this regard was the decision to establish an ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) by the year 2015. Announced at the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia in 2003, the ASC signalled a new phase in the nature of security cooperation in Southeast Asia. With the goal of "bringing ASEAN's political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another", and at the same time building regional capacity to respond to regional challenges, the APSC is by far the clearest indication that ASEAN is now moving away from its reticence in dealing with defence and security issues to a more open and robust engagement among its member states.[25]

Plans for the ASC were outlined in the Vientiane Plan of Action (VAP) in 2004. The VAP had proposed a number of strategies to push forward the agenda of security cooperation in the region and these have been grouped under the strategic clusters or thrusts on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building. In the area of conflict prevention, for instance, among the strategies identified have been the convening of an annual defence ministers' meeting, enhancing CBMs through conducting more military exchanges between defence officials and military academies, in addition to enhanced bilateral military exchanges, and producing an ASEAN Annual Security Outlook. Following these ideas, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) was convened on 9th May 2006 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The convening of the ADMM became the clearest signal to the international community that defence and security issues have now become legitimate subjects for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.

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[23] Karl Deutsch, "Security Communities", in James Rosenau (ed.) *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, New York: Free Press, 1961.

[24] See for example, Jurgen Ruland, "ASEAN and the Asian Crisis: Theoretical Implications and Practical Consequences for Southeast Asian Regionalism", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 421-51; Jeannie Henderson, *Reassessing ASEAN*, Adelphi Paper 323 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1999); John Garofano, "Flexibility or Irrelevance: Ways Forward for the ARF", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 21 No. 1 (April 1999).

[25] Mely Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.

2.2 ASEAN Regional Forum: Complementary or 'Supra-structure' Regional Security Institution?

The previous discussion on ASEAN's vision of regional order and security approaches has highlighted the assiduous efforts taken by the group to manage intra-regional relations and ensure regional security from within. It also discussed the extent to which ASEAN as a body had tried to avoid major power domination and eschew becoming the cockpit of major power competition. Yet the enduring feature of *realpolitik* in Asia has remained, as seen in the way the San Francisco system of hub and spokes/alliances has endured despite questions about its relevance in a post-Cold War environment. Within Asia, four states have defence alliance relations with the United States: Japan, Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. But despite the latter two Southeast Asian countries being part of the US-led alliance system, this has not precluded them from actively participating in the ASEAN-led efforts at promoting multilateral security cooperation through a set of regional processes geared to build trust and CBMs, as well as enhance mutual security interests.

Whether these two broad approaches hinder or promote regional order and security and the extent to which they enhance prospects of deepening regionalism in Asia need to be further examined. So far, there is no consensus yet on whether the differing security systems in Asia would enhance or undermine regional peace and stability. Yet, the myriad security challenges confronting the region, from the traditional inter-state competition to emerging trans-border security threats, demand no less than a broader multilateral security framework for promoting cooperative security. This had been the overriding rationale in the idea behind the establishment of the ARF.

The ARF was the culmination of a process that began with non-ASEAN actors who argued that the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region needed a security organisation that could alleviate regional tensions.[26] Initially, the ASEAN states resisted these calls, but eventually ASEAN realised that if an Asian security regime was going to develop, it was better for ASEAN to be pulling the cart than trying to catch up.[27] Some analysts have argued that ASEAN initiated the ARF, in part, to ensure that the grouping remained the pre-eminent regional institution in the Asia-Pacific. But more important in the decision to establish the ARF was the realisation that some kind of a cooperative security "enterprise" linking ASEAN's major partners in Northeast Asia and North America was needed to fill in the power vacuum left by the ending of Cold War.[28] The anxieties by regional states during this period was best articulated by former Singaporean Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng who told his fellow ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur: "With the end of the Cold War, we cannot assume that the Western powers will continue to woo ASEAN...we need to transform the substance of both ASEAN and our relationship with the major powers."[29] The formation of the ARF can be said to be the result of that transformation.

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[26] Mikhail Gorbachev suggested something along these lines as early as 1986. By 1988, Gareth Evans of Australia was suggesting a regional security organ along the lines of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Joe Clark of Canada also added his voice to these calls. Japan later advanced the idea, with the support of Canada and Australia, though the US opposed any regional security organization that it did not control.

[27] As noted above, while many ideas about cooperative security mechanism was being floated from the outside the region, ASEAN members also started to explore other possible models that were more suitable to regional conditions. Between 1990 and 1991, several official meetings were held on this subject. These in turn generated specific proposals emanating from academics, think-tanks and government officials on how Southeast Asia could address the new security challenges. One of these proposals was the recommendation from the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) in 1991 that ASEAN should use the Post Ministerial Conference for political and security dialogues with non-ASEAN countries in the region.

[28] Simon Sheldon, "Wither Security Regionalism?", in Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh (eds.) Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007, pp. 113-33.

[29] Singapore Government Press Release, No. 38/Jul 09-1/91/07/19, p. 3.

Following the need to fill the perceived gap was also the desire by ASEAN states to invite the major powers in Asia to have a stake in the stability and security of Southeast Asia, not through the practice of *realpolitik* but through an "enmeshment" process of socialisation and norm-building. [30]   By promoting the norms codified in ASEAN's TAC, the ARF's vision of a larger regional order was the hope that the TAC's commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes could be extended to and imbibed by other states joining the institution.

Other analysts, however, point to the unstated objective of ARF's norm-building exercise, that is, the goal of "socialising" China—the only extra-regional state with territorial claims in Southeast Asia.   Tacitly, by cultivating habits of dialogue and fostering trust and confidence-building, China would be encouraged to explain its security policy to its neighbours.   In turn, China's neighbours could respond with their own concerns about its policies and thus enhancing regional stability.[31]   Thus, by 'locking-in' the major powers in the region—the US, China, and Japan–ASEAN had tacitly aimed to blur the divide between the *realpolitik* and liberal approaches to building regional order and security in Southeast Asia and beyond.

Understanding the ARF

The objectives of the ARF outlined in its 1995 concept paper were to: Foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interests and concern, make significant contribution to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the region, and work towards the strengthening and enhancement of political security cooperation within the region as a means of ensuring peace and stability. The key goal was to create a "predictable and constructive pattern of relationships for the Asia-Pacific region".[32]

The ARF's institutional design as a broad regional security institution is considered unique, *sui generis*, in that it promotes inclusive membership—spanning a wide geographical footprint extending beyond Asia.   Since its inception in 1994, the ARF's membership has expanded to 27 countries.[33]   Its members include all the major powers in the international system—the US, China, Russia, Japan, India and the European Union–discussing a wide range of regional security threats, both traditional and non-traditional.

From the start, ASEAN exercised its leadership role in the ARF, insisting on the right to set the agenda and adapting the ASEAN Way of interaction to the proceedings of the ARF. ASEAN also laid out a three-step program for the ARF's evolution into a more robust security structure: In the first stage, the ARF would focus on confidence-building methods, followed by the second stage of preventive diplomacy, and the third stage of conflict resolution.   No timetable was set for the achievement of each of these stages; these measures would evolve at their own pace.   In the meantime, the ARF will continue to be a forum in which the regional powers could meet and interact.

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[30] For earlier analyses on the concerns of regional states at that time, see for example Jusuf Wanandi, "ASEAN and an Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue", in Hadi Soesastro (ed.) ASEAN in a Changed Regional and International Political Economy, Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, pp. 143-158.

[31] Simon Sheldon, op. cit., p. 122. See also Alistair Iain Johnston, "Socialisation in International Relations: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory", in G. John Ikenberry and Michel Mastanduno (eds.) International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, pp. 123-44.

[32] 1995 ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper.

[33] ARF comprises the 10 ASEAN states, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Mongolia, US, Canada, the European Union, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

The conscious attempt by ASEAN to shape the institutional design of the ARF is indicative of the preferences of members to ensure that the ARF would not be seen as some kind of a "superstructure" that subsumes ASEAN nor competes with it. At the first ARF meeting in Bangkok, Thailand in 1994, it was decided that "in its initial phase the ARF should therefore concentrate on enhancing the trust and confidence among participants and thereby foster a regional environment conducive to maintaining the peace and prosperity of the region."[34] It was also envisioned that the ARF adopt two complementary approaches to building confidence. Firstly, this could be done by following the ASEAN-established practice of consultation, consensus and frequent dialogue through the exchange of high-level visits. In practical terms, this has been embodied in the ARF's endorsement of the terms of the TAC and the requirement that all new members first accede to the TAC before admission into the ARF. Secondly, concrete CBMs could be implemented at both a Track 1 (government) and Track 2 (non-governmental and other non-official organizations) level.

Why CBMs? In a 1997 study on the ARF commissioned by the Canadian Government, confidence-building efforts in the Asia Pacific region were identified as meeting the objectives of:

- Reducing tensions and suspicions;
- Reducing the risk of accidental war or war by miscalculation;
- Fostering communication and cooperation in a way that deemphasizes the use of military force;
- Bringing about a better understanding of one another's security problems and defence priorities; and
- Developing a greater sense of strategic confidence in the region.

Three categories of CBMs were identified: Principles/declaratory measures, transparency measures, and constraining measures. (Further detailed information on CBMs is contained in Table 1 of Appendix 3).

As noted above, the key goal of CBMs is to reduce uncertainty and suspicion. As such, a number of initiatives have been established within the ARF to increase transparency and to encourage the exchange of information between ARF member states. Chief among these have been the ARF Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence Building Measures (which has since become the ISG on CBM and PD). Other Inter-sessional Meetings have also been conducted to promote the sharing of expertise and discussion in such areas as Search and Rescue Coordination and Cooperation, Peacekeeping, Disaster Relief among others. Seminars and expert group meetings have also been organised on such areas as De-mining, Transnational Crime, Terrorist Financing and Prevention, Marine Security Challenges and many others. (An outline of multilateral CBMs in the ARF and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific is contained in Table 2 of Appendix 3). Furthermore, a number of military-to-military meetings and exchanges (such as the meeting of the heads of Defence Colleges and Institutions) have also been held under the ARF ambit. In addition, ARF member states have taken the initiative to increase transparency by publishing defence White Papers and statements outlining their perspectives on regional issues. It is worth noting that the CBMs undertaken by the ARF are predominantly principle/declaratory and transparency measures, with very few, if at all, constraining in nature.

Given the overall objective of promoting cooperative security through fostering 'habits of dialogue', the ARF's institutional development is at best parsimonious. This has

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[34] 1995 ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper

earned the ARF the title of being nothing but a "talk shop".   So far, there has been very little progress in moving to Stage II on Preventive Diplomacy (PD).   Aside from the much-talked about "achievements" of the ARF in: First, adoption of the Concepts and Principles of PD (including the eight key principles of PD); second, establishment of the ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons Group; and third, enhanced role of the ARF Chair, there is no basic infrastructure put in place to advance PD–such as early-warning procedures, good offices or fact-finding arrangements and procedures for preventive deployment in case of contingencies, e.g. ASEAN Troika.

Given the lack of institutional support, the ARF is understandably neither prepared nor equipped to respond to crises that need specialised expertise.   For example, the ARF was not able to act during the East Timor crisis in 1999.   Being no Peacekeeping Training Centre which can act not only as a good CBM but also as a ready supplier of troops for peacekeeping operations, it hence did not come close to having any rapidly deployable peacekeeping force.   Moreover, while fostering habits of dialogue has its advantages, this type of modality as informed by the ASEAN Way may not be suitable for the ARF to handle certain crises without appropriate institutionalisation; its refusal to deal with domestic issues and relying instead on consensus-building.   In a much bigger grouping and with members having different expectations (e.g. ASEAN keeping its centrality in the region, China's desire to reduce US influence, the US as supplementing its alliance-based strategy), the ARF is therefore severely constrained in adopting a more robust agenda beyond its initial limited objectives of fostering habits of constructive dialogue and consultation, promoting transparency and create predictable patterns of relationships.

Against these constraints, the ARF's responses to crises have also been mostly ad hoc.   In response to the global war against terrorism, the ARF ISG has sponsored several ARF workshops on the prevention of terrorism.   Discussions had focused on blocking terrorist financing and looking at possible coordination with international financial institutions (IFIs) and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATL).   The ARF also established an ISG on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime.   The ARF also adopted the Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security at its ministerial meeting in Phnom Penh in June 2003.   Yet, there is the question of effectiveness of these ad hoc responses.   Moreover, much of the activities under the aegis of the ARF have been undertaken on a voluntary basis, which means that only those members that are interested in the issue areas outlined for cooperative activities participate.   In this regard, one would agree that without a strong Secretariat, the effectiveness of initiatives taken by the ARF which require close coordination and constant monitoring would be severely handicapped.   Almost two decades since its establishment, the ARF still relies on the ASEAN Secretariat to carry out the task of coordination

Given the above factors, the nature of regional capacities and responses indicates one crucial fact, that is, the ARF can only be as strong and effective as how its member states want it to be.   Against these observable trends, it not surprising that assessment of the ARF has not been positive.   It harks back to an argument raised sometime back by Michael Leifer who declared that it would be "a categorical mistake to think that the ARF can actually solve problems". To Leifer, it was more realistic to regard the Forum as "a modest contribution to a viable balance or distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific by other traditional means" but that these means were limited since "the multilateral undertaking faces the same order of difficulty as the biblical Hebrew slaves in Egypt who were obliged to make bricks without straw."[35]

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[35] Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security*, Adelphi Paper No. 304, (Oxford: University Press/ International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), p.59.

But against all the inadequacies of the ARF, one would note that even its fiercest critics would agree that as a multilateral forum for security, the ARF has had moderate success.   The importance of the ARF as a vehicle for airing the security concerns of member states has been recognised.   Many security analysts also credit socialisation through the ARF for engendering a more positive attitude from states that were initially suspicious of multilateralism. Thus, contrary to Leifer's contention, the cooperative security aspects of the ARF, though modest, are not just adjuncts to the workings of the balance of power. Through constant dialogue, CBMs, preventive diplomacy, and the norms of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation—the ARF continues to aim at "moderating and mitigating the competitive and conflictual by-products of power balancing behaviour."[36]

3.   Regional Security Cooperation Beyond ASEAN and the ARF: Complementary or Competitive?

Since the start of the new millennium, a number of sub-regional security frameworks have emerged in Asia. (See Box1).   The sub-regional feature of these new multilateral security institutions that have dotted the regional security landscape is indeed significant, particularly when viewed from the perspective of institutional complementarity and competition.   In Northeast Asia, the Six–Party Talks, or SPT, was established in 2002 as a successor to the Korean Energy Development Organisation.   Unlike ASEAN, the SPT was initiated with the specific purpose of addressing the North Korean nuclear issue.   Its aim therefore is the eventual dismantling of nuclear facilities in North Korea.   While issue-specific in coverage, the SPT has brought in the participation of major powers—China, US, Russia, and Japan–that have a stake in the resolution of the problem on the Korean peninsula.   However, unlike the more institutionalised ASEAN and the ARF, the SPT meets on an ad hoc basis.   It has no founding declaration and no Secretariat.

Although the ARF continues to discuss the problems of the Korean peninsula in its deliberations, the establishment of the SPT was regarded as a positive development in providing the specific states concerned with a mechanism dedicated to deal with the nuclear problem in Northeast Asia.   In this regard, the SPT was seen as complementary to the broader multilateral security process that the ARF was promoting.   Against the distinct overlay of Cold War *realpolitik* and alliance formation, the bringing together of the US and China on the North Korean problem—with the former restrained in its coercive options and the latter signalling a "shift" in its historical alliance with Pyongyang—is indeed highly significant.   The SPT has made China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the US coordinate their actions vis-a vis North Korea in ways never demonstrated before.[37]   The SPT therefore has provided a framework for broader Northeast Asian multilateral cooperation.

Recent events, however, have cast a shadow over the prospects of the SPT. Changes in US policy under the Bush Administration provided North Korea with an "escape hatch" to deflect increased pressures from China to de-nuclearise.   And when Beijing joined in the UN condemnation of the failed satellite launch by North Korea in April 2009, Pyongyang declared its withdrawal from the SPT, and announced its intention to continue its nuclear weapons development.   Despite this setback, hopes are that with China holding

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[36] Yuen Foong Khong, " Making bricks without straw in the Asia Pacific?", *The Pacific Review*, Vol.10, No.2, 1997, p.298
[37] Michael Green and Bates Gill, op. cit., p. 21.

significant leverage over North Korea, Beijing will continue to see the SPT as a useful avenue in its pursuit of long-term geopolitical objectives on the Korean Peninsula.[38]

Dotting the Asian security landscape is also the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). A reincarnation of the Shanghai Five (1996), it was born with the addition of Uzbekistan in 2001. Its current members are Russia, China and the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia are observers. The grouping started off with the idea to resolve border disputes and has now gone on to conduct joint military exercises. The SCO focuses on the "three evils" of terrorism, extremism and separatism, as outlined in the Shanghai Convention on the Fight against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. But it has also developed a robust security agenda that promotes regional cooperation in addressing drug trafficking and organised crime. And while the SCO can be categorised as essentially a sub-regional security framework, it has now also expanded its remit to include energy and economic cooperation.

Similar to ASEAN's emphasis on norm-building, the SCO through Article 5 of its Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, promotes the principles of non-interference, non-use of force, resolution of problems through mutual consultation and not seek unilateral military superiority in contiguous regions.[39] This is seen is SCO's 26-article Charter which also stresses mutual trust, good neighbourliness and cooperation. In fact, the SCO's equivalent of the ASEAN Way is the "Shanghai Way".

Although norm-building facilitates cooperation and promotes CBMs and information exchange among countries within the contiguous region, the SCO has also been viewed as a regional mechanism to contain the US' expanding influence in the region. Led by China, the SCO is perceived as China's vehicle to assert its expanding role and influence in that part of Asia. Russia, on the other hand, is seen to be on the same page as China on advancing the principle of non-interference (from the US) in the affairs of Central Asia.

Aside from the SPT and the SCO, there are other ad hoc security arrangements in Asia not defined by geographic footprint but by issue-specific cooperation. Among these are the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP**)** founded in 2004, and the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) established in 2003 to address the threat of nuclear proliferation. Finalised in November 2004, ReCAAP is the first government-to-government agreement to enhance maritime security in Asia. The initiative, which was originally proposed by the Japanese Prime Minister in October 2001, aims to enhance multilateral cooperation amongst 16 regional countries, namely ASEAN plus Japan, China, Korea, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh to combat sea piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region. The ReCAAP Agreement was finalised in November 2004 in Tokyo, with Singapore the depository of the Agreement.[40]

So far, 12 countries have signed the ReCAAP Agreement: Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of India, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Laos Peoples' Democratic Republic, the Union of Myanmar, and the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of

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[38] Jayshree Bajoria and Carin Zissis, "The Six-Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program", Council on Foreign Relations, updated 1 July 2009. Available at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13593/>. Accessed on 1 September 2009.

[39] *Declaration of the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*, Shanghai, China, 15 June 2001.

[40] For more on ReCAAP, see http://www.recaap.org/html/.

Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Of these, 11 have ratified the Agreement, which comes into full force on 4 September 2006.

Although more global in reach, the PSI represents a coalition of countries that have agreed to "move quickly on direct, practical measures to impede the trafficking in WMD, missiles and related items."[41] Participating countries in the Asia-Pacific are Australia, Japan, Singapore and the Philippines. Others such as China and South Korea claim they are supporting the PSI but have refrained from participating due, in part, to objections from North Korea. PSI participants have conducted a number of air, ground and sea interdiction exercises to develop and demonstrate its capability to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear weapons and fissile material. What is significant with the PSI is the clear US imprint on this minilateral initiative. While the US is involved in other ad hoc multilateral security forums like the SPT, it is China, however, that is seen to be the more pro-active player.

Another US initiative supposedly targeted at complementing the PSI–and to some extent, Asia's ReCAAP (for maritime security)–is the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). The RMSI specifically aims to promote cooperation among the navies of Asia-Pacific countries "to assess and then provide detailed plans and then synchronize interagency and international capacity to fight threats that use the maritime space to facilitate their illicit activity". [42] The original idea was to implement RMSI by coordinating activities that support the following elements of maritime security: Increased situational awareness and information sharing, enhanced maritime interception capacity, and agency/ministerial/international cooperation. The RMSI idea, however, received a lukewarm response in the region. ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia strongly objected to its application in Southeast Asia especially in the Straits of Malacca. They argued that maritime security in the Straits of Malacca is the sole responsibility of Malaysia, Indonesia and other littoral states. They are not in favour of implementing additional mechanisms when there already is a mechanism in place among the littoral countries of the Straits of Malacca that is devoted to combating piracy and transnational crime.

In sum, the emergence of several institutions that are shaping the contours of Asia's security architecture poses significant implications on the relevance of more established institutions like the ARF. It also raises questions with regard to the relevance and centrality of ASEAN which has so far held the leadership in the ARF, and other multilateral institutions like the ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asian Summit. With regard to the latter, it can however be argued that security issues dealt with by the SPT and SCO are region specific and hence the issue/concern about ASEAN's centrality may not be that relevant in the context of Northeast Asia and Central Asia given their distinct sub-regional security dynamics. One could therefore suggest that the emergence of new multilateral mechanisms can be viewed as positive developments.

Mindful of the arguments presented by other analysts that the multiplicity of multilateral institution and activities in the Asia-Pacific has only engendered great power competition—given that the region's great power now has the option of using these mechanisms as instruments of "competition influence", e.g. Beijing and Moscow in SCO, and Washington in PSI,[43] - it can be counter-argued that these institutions can and do in fact create new opportunities to improve the security climate in these regions beset by inter-

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[41] 'Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman's Statement at the Second Meeting", Brisbane, Australia, 10 July 2003. Available at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/globalissues/psi/chair&_statement_0603.html>.

[42] For more on the RMSI initiative, see US Pacific Command/PACOM website at http://www.pacom.mil/rmsi/.

[43] Brendan Taylor and Bill Tow, "Challenges to Building an Effective Asia-Pacific Security Architecture", in Michael Green and Bates Gill, op.cit., pp. 329-50.

state competition and complex security problems brought on by the legacies of the Cold War. Moreover, while the tradition of bilateral alliances and alignments remain strong in Northeast Asia, the creation of the SPT, though ad hoc, and the SCO further demonstrate the value accorded to multilateral security institutions. These sub-regional institutions represent different layers of an increasingly dense web of multilateral security institutions which address different aspects of regional security. Taken together, what this growing trend represents is a shared, Asia-wide convergence on the key benefits that multilateral security institutions bring to member states. To reiterate, these are: building trust, increasing transparency and developing CBMs; mooting principle and codes of conduct in inter-state relations; enhancing cooperation in other non-traditional security threats like terrorism, drug trafficking, irregular migration and environmental degradation; and facilitating and promoting economic development.

Highlighting the benefits of regional multilateral security institutions does not mean, however, that these RSIs are not without problems. On the issue of efficiency in addressing an array of security challenges, the assessments so far range from cautious optimism to doubts and criticisms about the relevance and effectiveness of some RSIs. A key element raised on the future of RSIs is the role of major powers in supporting these institutions. These concerns are discussed in more detail in the final section on summary and conclusion.

4.   Identity and Community Building in Asia

Despite the debates and concerns about the efficacy of RSIs, the growing trend of emerging, loosely-constructed security institutions nonetheless reinforce the point raised earlier by Muthiah Alagappa on a regional order that is also about "a regional community with institutional and normative attributes". In scanning the Asian security architecture which clearly has more than one master builder, at least a couple of issues arise: Which community? Whose norms?

In Southeast Asia, and perhaps even the wider East Asia, ASEAN is so far the only institution that is becoming a regional community. Its goal of establishing an ASEAN Political and Security Community by 2015 is a product of decades of cultivating a thick web of close interaction, socialisation and cooperation which has formed the basis of a regional identity. In an earlier work that looks at the bases for building a security community, scholars like Adler and Barnett highlighted the importance of the development of social learning which underpins normative expectations among the group of states and their diffusion from country to country, generation to generation.[44] However, to realise such a goal particularly in a wider regional context, social learning would require that participation in regional processes goes beyond state actors.

To a certain extent, this is already taking place in East Asia. Security cooperation is enhanced through active participation and contributions by the Track 2 (unofficial) institutions in the region. Among the most visible ones, noted for their contributions and cited in official documents of ASEAN and the ARF, are the experts from the ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). These epistemic communities reflect the "bottom up" approach to the shaping and building of Asia's security community.

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[44] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.) *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

In defining its role, ASEAN-ISIS has sought to provide ASEAN with policy inputs on political and security issues that affected the region for the consideration of the decision-makers in ASEAN.[45]   Formally established in 1988, ASEAN-ISIS has been able to carry out this function by submitting critical policy recommendations (e.g. Memoranda) to ASEAN officials and their respective governments.   Among important recommendations were the establishment of the ARF, the strengthening of the ASEAN Secretariat, and the ASEAN Charter.   ASEAN-ISIS also played an integral role in the establishment of CSCAP, which became the official Track 2 analogue for the ARF.   CSCAP's work—reflected in its various working groups that deal specifically with a wide range of security challenges such as maritime security, transnational crime, weapons of mass destruction and others—is fed into the inter-governmental processes through its regular policy submissions to and interaction with the ARF Senior Officials meeting.   While CSCAP as an organisation under the ARF involves extra-regional partners, the focus of the CSCAP working and study groups remains East Asian.[46]

There is also the Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT).   NEAT emerged from the East Asian Vision Group report, which called for a network "to be established to explore long term policy issues of strategic importance to the region."   With its foci on regional political and security cooperation as well as economic and financial architecture, but with a membership based on the ASEAN+3 states, NEAT draws upon experts, academics as well as policymakers in advancing community building.

The engagement of Track 2 communities in multilateral security forums has opened spaces for policy discourses where iterations of concepts like comprehensive, cooperative, human security, and security community find greater traction and geared toward the broader objective of building a semblance of an ASEAN—if not Asian—community.   In this regard, the building of regional identity has brought in a participatory form of regionalism where new patterns of multi-level processes result in complex institutional linkages and coalitions emerge to address a wide-range of security issues.[47]

On the other hand, the building of a security community in East Asia through the process of promoting shared values and norms also brings with it inherent tensions.   This is now taking place in ASEAN and clearly demonstrated in the events leading to the adoption the ASEAN Charter.   The much-awaited Charter drew sharp criticisms from representatives of civil society organisations in the region that dismissed the document as "void of vision, progress and courage that is needed to guide ASEAN to face the future".[48]   Moreover, given the different streams of political transitions that are taking place in the region, arguably as

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[45] The ASEAN-ISIS comprises: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta; the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS Malaysia) in Kuala Lumpur; the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) in Manila; the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) in Singapore; the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Bangkok; the Institute for International Relations (IIR) in Hanoi; Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) in Phnom Penh; the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) in Vientiane; and the Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS) in Bandar Seri Begawan.

[46] For more detailed discussion on role of ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP, see for example, Carolina Hernandez, "Track-Two and Regional Policy: The ASEAN-ISIS in ASEAN Decision Making", and Desmond Ball and Brendan Taylor, "Reflections on Track Process in the Asia-Pacific Region", in Hadi Soesastro, Clara Joewono, and Carolina Hernandez (eds.) *Twenty-two Years of ASEAN-ISIS: Origins, Evolution and Challenges of Track Two Diplomacy*, Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2006.

[47] For participatory regionalism, see Jean Grugel, "New Regionalism and Modes of Governance: Comparing US and EU Strategies in Latin America", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 10, no. 40, 2006, pp. 603-26.

[48] Mely Caballero-Anthony, "The ASEAN Charter: An Opportunity Missed or One that Cannot be Missed?", in *Southeast Asian Affairs,* Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008.

part of the ongoing process of political changes that began after the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, pressures for human rights and democratisation coming from ASEAN democratic states' tensions are starting to strain regional relations.   Despite its perceived weaknesses, the ASEAN Charter no doubt forms the basis for shaping the normative transformation of the institution—beyond the ASEAN Way.   Thus, as rules are being changed, and principles of non-interference are less adhered to, uncertainties arise as to the prospects of building a common identity and a security community in Southeast Asia.

Some of these uncertainties stem from the challenges posed by transborder security threats which require a collective will to effectively address these challenges. Dealing with maritime threats, infectious diseases, and crossborder pollution like the haze that annually envelops part of Southeast Asia had led to the introduction of new initiatives and regional mechanisms that are significantly different from previous types of regional arrangements. These are significant in that they encourage a wider and deeper type of regional cooperation that would be considered as being intrusive to the domestic affairs of states. In the case of dealing with infectious diseases for instance, ASEAN's plans for building a regional disease surveillance mechanism would necessitate more intrusive arrangements especially since the threat of a pandemic outbreak has regional and global implications. Similarly, in the case of dealing with transnational crime such as terrorism, human smuggling and drug trafficking, ASEAN countries will need to be more open to cross-border enforcement. Thus, all these ASEAN declarations to address non-traditional security issues would have to give way to more common actions in solving common problems, more binding commitments and more credible enforcements if the institution were to become more effective and relevant against new security challenges. [49] That said, similar challenges now confront the ARF.

While these interesting dynamics are now taking place in ASEAN, less can be said about identity and community building in Northeast Asia, Central Asia and South Asia. Although it was mentioned earlier that the SCO does have a Charter, it is hard at this moment to imagine normative shifts to key issues on democracy and human rights.   The dynamics in South Asia are equally complex, with Asia's largest and oldest democracy—India—sharing common democratic values with Japan rather than its closest neighbours.

5.   Summary and Conclusion

The paper set out to examine the plethora of regional security institutions in Asia and examine the extent to which they contribute to promoting peace and security in the region. To be sure, the growing number of institutions that have emerged changes the perception, held not too long ago, that Asia is under-institutionalised.   But the enthusiasm of having more numbers has been tempered by concerns that competition and rivalry could rock the foundations laid down by 'older' institutions like ASEAN and the ARF in managing regional security.   Ironically, the zest for building regional security multilateralism and promoting cooperative security has been replaced by fears of competitive geometries.

In addressing concerns about competition and rivalry, I go back to the first two inter-related factors outlined in the second section of the paper that define the evolution and current shape of regional security institutions we have in Asia, at least from the context of ASEAN and the ARF. As noted above, ASEAN's visions of regional order, predicated on the concepts of comprehensive and cooperative security, had informed decisions by member

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[49] Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Non-Traditional Security and Multilateralism in Asia: Re-shaping the Contours of Regional Security Architecture", in Michael Green and Bates Gill, (eds.), *Asia's New Multilateralism*, op. cit. pp. 306-328.

states on the kinds of security approaches to pursue, i.e. power balancing or cooperative security. These two inter-related factors have in turn determined ASEAN's institutional design, which is characterised as informal and flexible. The lack of formal structures notwithstanding, ASEAN's focus on comprehensive and cooperative security has in more ways than one undergirded the region's preference for engagement with like and non-like minded states, promoting confidence-building measures, habits of dialogue and norm-building, as opposed to the game of balancing, hedging and bandwagoning *vis a vis* major powers. Similar institutional design and security approaches inform the nature of the more broad-based Asian security institution—the ARF, reflecting the attempts by ASEAN to apply the modalities of the 'ASEAN way' writ large to the wider Asia-Pacific region.[50] These strategies essentially make up the dense web of the socialisation processes that have been taking place among member states of the ARF and the other ASEAN-led institutions in Asia—ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asian Summit.

That socialisation processes and the strategy of engagement and enmeshment with major powers have worked in avoiding wars in Asia are still being contested. However, it is notable that despite occasional conflicts between and among members in ASEAN and the ARF, war has yet to break out. Meanwhile, relations between China and ASEAN have been greatly enhanced and have in fact been cited as a successful test-case of how norm-building and socialisation have worked to promote regional security. China's signing of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003, eight years after its posturing in the Mischief Reef, has gone a long way in warming ties with her ASEAN neighbours which not too long ago regarded China as a security threat. Further, the latest move by the United States to finally sign the TAC as a prelude to its membership in the EAS after years of prevarication indicates the political value that Washington attaches to ASEAN-led security initiatives.

But while providing a normative framework for security cooperation has been beneficial, its limits have also been recognised. 'Old' conflicts stemming from territorial disputes still persist, while an array of emerging transnational threats have raised new demands and heightened urgency for regional institutions to respond, and respond effectively.

Thus, ASEAN's move to establish the APSC is in response to its obvious shortcomings. Consequently, we note that the kinds of measures that are currently being initiated under the APSC to tackle complex, non-traditional security (NTS) threats are significantly different from ASEAN's usual process-oriented, confidence-building modalities. Most of these initiatives are problem-solving measures that involve, among others: The sharing of information, developing certain types of regional surveillance systems for early warning on infectious diseases and natural disasters, providing relief and assistance in disaster management, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and more significantly, working toward more coordinated responses and even attempts at harmonising legal frameworks in addressing transnational crimes. Although these problem-solving efforts are at an inchoate stage and would require some time before any definite assessment can be made as to their efficacy, the fact is that ASEAN and to some extent the ARF are being 're-tooled' to respond to more complex security challenges. Against these developments, one can suggest that we are now seeing a more qualitative, albeit embryonic change, in regional security

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[50] Much has been written about the normative approach to security by ASEAN. See for example, Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order,* London and New York: Routledge, 2001; Jurgen Haacke, A*SEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects,* London and New York: Routledge, 2003; and Mely Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security Beyond the ASEAN Way*, op. cit.

cooperation.   At least in the Southeast Asian sub-region, this new level of security cooperation offers improved prospects for the realisation of an ASEAN security community.

On the other hand, the prospects for security regionalism beyond Southeast Asia and across the wider Asia is less sanguine or even absent in some RSIs.   For example, from the many analyses on the ARF, the best that most positive assessments could come up with is the fact that it is the only multilateral security framework that brings together all the major powers with medium and small ones, regardless of their varying political and economic systems.   But quite obviously, it is also the very nature of this *sui generis* institution that explains why progress has been extremely slow despite its 15-year history.   The dynamics of having the United States, China, Japan and India in this trans-Pacific grouping has proven to be more of a hindrance than an asset to the ARF's ability to come up with a rapid and effective response to security challenges posed by 'hard' security issues like nuclear proliferation, territorial disputes, maritime threats, internal conflicts, as well as other cross-border security threats like transnational crimes.   At best, the ARF only provides the forum but not the platform for effective action to address these threats.   It is interesting to note for instance, that even a multilateral response to deal with catastrophic disasters like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was carried out not through the ARF framework but through informal, ad hoc coalitions among the United States, European countries, and Japan. China, Korea and India provided assistance in their individual capacities.   It was the same arrangement for ASEAN members.   Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines did not come as ASEAN but as individual countries helping their neighbour, Indonesia.

In the Northeast Asian region, security regionalism has also been difficult despite having established a multilateral security framework like the Six-Party talks. This is due to a number of reasons.   Firstly, the Northeast Asian security complex is made more problematic by the presence of three nuclear powers—Russia, China, and North Korea—with no credible or stable mutual deterrence mechanism among them.   Secondly, there is a significant shift in the distribution of power with China now seen as a rising power while Japan—which was until recently a major power—is perceived as 'ailing'.[51]   This in turn raised new forms of anxieties made complicated by the chequered nature of Sino-Japan relations.   Thirdly, regarding the convening of the Six-Party talks—the first multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia is indeed an achievement—its success depends heavily on the extent to which the DPRK makes significant concessions.   Sadly, the past record is far from promising.   Finally, the Northeast Asian security complex also presents a variety of competing institutions addressing bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral issues reflecting different agenda and commitments.   The effectiveness of the Six-Party talks would also depend on how it can connect with other existing frameworks in the region.

It is a similar picture further north with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).   Despite its robust security agenda in fighting terrorism, extremism and separatism, the grouping is beset with intra-member rivalries.   Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan compete for regional supremacy in Central Asia, not to mention the competition between the two major powers—China and Russia.   Analysts have also noted the different perceptions among Central Asian states of their interests and the role of the SCO.   As noted by Zhuangzhi, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan see their membership in the SCO as a means to enhance their prestige.   Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, on the other hand, consider their membership in the SCO as a tool to address domestic instability.   Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also have serious reservations about the security policies of Uzbekistan.   Mutual distrust and

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[51] Kiichi Fujiwara, 'Northeast Asia and the chance of a new security architecture', East Asia Forum blog, 1 May 2009. Available at <http://www.eastasiaforum.or/2009/0/02/northeast-asia-and-the-chance-a-new-security-architecture>, accessed 17 November 2009.

perceptual differences therefore affect the level of participation, interest and commitment of members states to the SCO.[52]   Moreover, the SCO also suffers institutional constraints to push through with regional security initiatives. Its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), which is seen as an important security institution, is severely hampered by its lack of intelligence and resources to sufficiently meet the massive tasks of counter-terrorism in Central Asia.[53]

From the above, it is clear that whatever potential there is for security regionalism in Asia, this is so far limited only to Southeast Asia.   Whether ASEAN's experience of building regional institutions can be extended to the more turbulent Northeast Asia and push for an East Asian community is contingent on at least two factors: The ability of ASEAN to push through with a credible APSC and the improved relations among China, Japan and South Korea.   So far, despite the qualified success of ASEAN as the only effective security institution in Asia, it also faces similar limitations and problems, albeit on a different scale, in moving ahead with this goal of establishing a security community.

Nevertheless, the different stories of regional security institutions in Asia provide interesting insights into the nature of regionalism in Asia.   There are summed up in the observations below.

Insights on Asia Regionalism: A Security Perspective
1.   Older, more 'mature' institutions present better prospects in advancing regionalism than new, younger institutions.

The broad survey of existing regional security institutions in Asia reveal that institutions that have been around longer than others have been able to make relatively more progress than those that are relatively new.   While not exactly a novel observation, this also explains why most studies on RSIs in Asia focus mainly on ASEAN and the ARF. It is in ASEAN where we see some movement towards building a security community.   This also explains why most analyses of the ARF invariably discuss the role of ASEAN and how pivotal it was to the founding of the latter.   In fact, many security analysts have continued to debate the role of ASEAN, without really much agreement on whether the grouping is more of a liability than an asset to the institutional design and/or innovation of the ARF.

Notwithstanding these debates, what the experience of ASEAN has shown is that the cultivation of peaceful relations through confidence-building measures and fostering mutual trust engenders a conducive environment to promote closer economic cooperation.   As discussed earlier, it was only through a peaceful Southeast Asia that economic integration could move forward.   Thus the building of an ASEAN community had to be anchored in the three inter-locking pillars of economic, security and socio-cultural cooperation.

Similarly, one can also argue that the establishment the APT was made easier by China's earlier membership in the ARF. Beijing's keen interest and even desired leadership in multilateral security and economic approaches at the regional level belie its earlier reluctance to get involved in multilateralism writ large.   Thus, we have today a China that promotes the notion of multipolarity while championing regional security cooperation in Asia. And while China's charm offensive is competing with Japan's own economic and diplomatic ties with Southeast Asian countries, the APT provides the framework for improving Sino-

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[52] Sun Zhuangzhi, 'From neighbours to partners', *Beijing Review*, 1 February 2007.
[53] Ishtiaq Ahmad, 'Shanghai Cooperation Organization: China, Russia, and Regionalism in Central Asia', paper delivered at the Conference on Inter-Asian Connections, 21-23 February 2008, University of Dubai, UAE.

Japanese and even Sino-Korean relations with ASEAN as the locus of this regional enterprise.

Whatever its limitations, it is also significant to note that the idea of having 'ASEAN in the driver's seat' continues to be a constant refrain in new initiatives to create new regional institutions, such as Australia's proposal for an Asia-Pacific community and Japan's East Asian community. It is noteworthy that both Australia and Japan appear to lean on ASEAN's support to make their proposals fly. And if the past experience of establishing wider regional frameworks like the ARF and APEC were instructive, i.e. that these ideas had to be 'tested' first within ASEAN, this tells us much about the ability of this older grouping to make a difference in the shaping of the regional multilateral security architecture in Asia.

> 2. *Norm-building and socialisation matter, but inadequate in building a security community.*

The narrative of the ARF has essentially revolved around its ability to instil and promote a normative framework to manage inter-state relations. The norms of non-interference, peaceful settlement of disputes, cultivated through habits of dialogue, confidence-building measures, and fostered through the modalities of consensus-building and inclusiveness—are all geared towards encouraging states to adopt a cooperative, multilateral and multipolar approach to prevent conflicts, rather than through alliance formation geared to defend against common enemies. As such, the ARF's ability to respond effectively to territorial disputes and other security threats, has been limited; similarly, so is its ability to change the global power structure despite having brought together all the major powers of the international system.

But even with the ARF's focus on cooperative and comprehensive security approaches, its lack of any institutional frameworks required to manage the political, security and even economic challenges renders its current institutional arrangement no more than talking shops. Moreover, the ARF's unyielding insistence on inclusion, based on geographic logics and visions of a geographic community rather than on complementary interests, effectively prevents it from advancing in all but very limited cooperation on functional matters.

> 3. *In the larger scheme of things, while being small is no less important, the ability to shape the wider regional order is still limited.*

The evolution of regional security institutions in Asia draws largely from the story of a small group of weaker states that initiated the creation of the ARF—Asia's first macro-regional security institution. What is further unique to ASEAN's role in the founding of the ARF is the kind of 'tacit' leadership that is exercises. While realists see this as a major flaw in Asia's security regionalism, institutionalists on the other hand regard this as a 'vindication of the role of soft and ideational power in the making of security arrangements that can promote regional and international order'.[54] To be sure, what ASEAN has accomplished is the region-wide acceptance of the normative foundations of regional interstate conduct. This is something that cannot be underestimated. Getting the United States to accede to the TAC as a prerequisite for its joining the EAS stands as a culmination of a process of successful multilateral diplomacy, one that now encompasses all key regional actors outside Southeast Asia in a network of over-lapping ASEAN-led institutions (the ARF, APT, and the

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[54] Amitav Acharya, 'Regional Security Arrangements in a Multipolar World?', Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Briefing Papers, 2004.

Asia-Europe Meeting). ASEAN's efforts therefore can be viewed as being the first 'architect' or the first 'builder' of a regional security community.

Nevertheless, the salience of ASEAN's role and/or its centrality in the ARF has its obvious limitations. ASEAN commands neither the material capacity nor the 'ideational force' to compel other regional or extra-regional actors to manage and shape the regional and global order. ASEAN itself is hampered by its own institutional constraints. Its insistence on the principles of non-interference, on equality of all members, and proceeding on the 'lowest common denominator' seriously restrict what the grouping can undertake. More importantly, these principles have allowed certain members to conveniently use them to serve their own interests and prevent the grouping to advance any institutional innovation that has been outlined in its Charter and blueprints for ASEAN's Economic Community (AEC) and APSC.

        4.   Role of major powers decisive in shaping regional security architecture.

From the above, it follows that for any macro-regional or supra-regional security institution to progress, there has to be commitment and leadership from the major powers. In Asia, the roles of the United States and China are critical in the resolution of the Korean peninsula imbroglio. So is the role of Russia, working closely with the United States on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. In the area of NTS, the agreement between the United States, China and India on climate change is absolutely crucial to advancing a post-Kyoto protocol.

The commitment and leadership of the major powers to advance any security regionalism that feature them as key stakeholders also holds true for economic regionalism. For instance, the AEC can only be successfully realised only as long as the United States, Japan and China remain committed to economic liberalisation and free trade. This is because - unlike the EU – the AEC will not be an internal market but instead will need to depend on these three giant economies for trade and investment. Within the framework of the wider ASEAN Plus Three, the Chiang Mai Initiative - as a liquidity support mechanism in times of capital account crisis - will require the financial resources of Japan and China (which hold the world's largest foreign exchange reserves) to make the mechanism workable. As far APEC is concerned, its momentum to advance open regionalism and promote free trade are largely driven by the United States, Japan and China. For example, the current discussions on creating an APEC-wide FTA or Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), as a means to jumpstart the stalled Doha Round negotiations at the World Trade Organization will realistically not be achieved without the endorsement of these three powers.

More importantly, with the perceived competition for economic supremacy in the region between the United States and China, how these two powers are able to work towards a more meaningful strategic partnership will either bode well or break the region in terms of its economic future and security. The current global economic and strategic landscape is not longer dictated by the actions and preferences of a single hegemonic power. Similarly, the provision of collective goods is no longer dependent on the single leadership of the United States. Particularly so in a highly fragmented Asia, the United States finds itself compelled to work together, and not against, any single power. In this regard, the value of multilateral security and/or economic institutions that brings together the major powers in the region must be calibrated to promote, to the extent possible, the common interests and security concerns of both small and big powers.

5.   Westphalian norms of sovereignty and non-interference remain paramount in regional security and economic cooperation, but spaces are opened for negotiation and compromise.

All of the current regional security arrangements across Asia are grounded on the norms of protecting state sovereignty and non-interference.   Against these norms, one could argue that prospects are doubtful for any deepening of security and economic regionalism in Asia unless the notion of ceding sovereign to supra-national institutions *a la* Europe can happen.   While this is largely true, security and economic regionalism in Asia (particularly East Asia) has come this far to allow for some spaces for negotiation.   ASEAN's progress in implementing the ASEAN Free Trade Area, albeit slow, is indicative of the willingness of states to negotiate their economic interests in the furtherance of common benefits derived from open regionalism.

Similarly, while it is inconceivable for states to abandon these Westphalian principles, the imperative of working together to address common threats make for a compelling reason to promote cooperative practices.   As NTS threats like pandemics, natural disasters, climate change, and irregular migration are more likely to extend their trans-border impacts, the urgency for members of regional security institutions to respond effectively to common, shared risks will necessitate cooperative approaches which would in turn result in the pooling, rather than the ceding, of sovereignty.

Conclusion: Whither an Asian security community?

Against the vast landscape of the Asian security architecture, characterised by a variety of different regional security institutions with starkly divergent security dynamics, how do these differences bode for the creation of a pan-Asian security community?

In the immediate future, it is hard to imagine an Asian security community ever emerging.   To be sure, the language of a security community is still very much confined to the Southeast or East Asian sub-region.   However, the notion of an Asian security community remains salient as a way of framing and/or promoting cooperative security approaches in response to complex, trans-border problems.   On these terms, the nature of security challenges facing Asia presents prospects for broader iterations of a security community across the region.   NTS issues like climate change, infectious diseases, food and water security, natural disasters, and others provide opportunities for enhancing functional security cooperation.[55]   NTS challenges also offer possibilities for mitigating inter-state competition.   The emphasis on building regional capacity to effectively address common risks also serves to foster trust and confidence, which improves prospects for building inter-regional institutional linkages.   For example, cooperation in combating transnational crimes (drug trafficking, smuggling, etc.) within the SCO provides opportunities for also building cross-institutional linkages with the ARF that already has a robust agenda in this issue area. The 'we-feeling' associated with security communities can therefore be translated into a greater sense of interdependence between and among the plethora of regional security institutions which were created with a common purpose of managing complex security issues.   Arguably, it is the growing trend of regional interdependence that serves as a powerful deterrent to conflict, reinforcing the idea that cooperative security engenders peace, and maintains regional order and security.

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[55] Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Non-Traditional Security and Multilateralism in Asia: Re-shaping the Contours of Regional Security Architecture", in Michael Green and Bates Gill, (eds.), *Asia's New Multilateralism*, op.cit., pp. 306-328.

Whether a strong sense of regional identity from working cooperatively across security issues paves the way for institutional transformation remains to be seen. Regional security institutions in Asia are still very much organised as inter-governmental bodies. That said, the rhetoric and assertions about identity allow Asian states, in their respective sub-regional settings and beyond, to have a greater voice and bigger role to play in shaping the regional security architecture alongside their visions of regional order.

Finally, Asia will continue to see the proliferation of security institutions as long as new security issues emerge and there are willing 'builders'. The region's history of co-existence allows for accommodating a mosaic of institutions. In a highly inter-connected global environment, the hard task therefore lies in the balancing of competing state-centric interests and the urgency to respond to pressing trans-border security challenges. Thus, against obvious institutional limitations and domestic constraints, the future of regional security institutions in Asia would be contingent on how regional actors can strike a delicate balance between the push and pull factors for greater regional cohesion.

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ASEAN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS ON MILITARY EXERCISE

ASEAN with United States:

Philippines	Balikatan*
Thailand/Singapore	Cobra Gold*
Mal/ Thai/ Sing/, Phil, Indon/ Brunei	CARAT: (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training)*
Sing Navy, Rep. of Korea Navy, JMSDF, RAN	Pacific Reach 2000
- RSAF	Commando Sling*
- RSAF, RAAF	Tri-Sling*
- RSN, RAN	Tri-Crab*
- WPNS	MCMEX/DIVEX
- RSAF,RTAF	Cope Tiger

Malaysia:

- RSN	Ex Malapura*
- Singapore army	Ex Semangat Bersatu
- TNI-AL/Marine Police	PATKOR OPTIMA*
- TNI-AL	Malindo Jaya*
- Phil. Navy/coast guard	PHIMAL*
- Phil. Navy	Mal-Phil Jaya*
- Thai Navy	Thalay-Laut*
- Thai Navy/Marine Police	Seaex-Thamal*
- Brunei Navy	Hornbil
- RAN	Mastex
- FDPA	ADEX/STARDEX/Starfish*
- TNI-AU	Elang Malindo/SAR Malindo
- RAAF	Elangaroo
- R Brunei Air Force	SAREX MALBRU
- Phil Air Force	SAREX MALPHIL
- Australia	Harringaroo
- R Brunei Air Force	Malbru
- US	CARAT*

Indonesia:

- Brunei Navy	Ex Helang Laut
- RSAF	Elang Indopura*
- Malaysian Marine Police	Aman Malindo*
- Singapore army	Ex Safkar Indopura
- RSN	Malindo Jaya*
- RSAF	Elang Indopura/Ex Camar Indopura
- RSN	Joint Minex
- RMN/Marine Police	Patkor Optima
- RMN	Malindo Jaya
- US	CARAT*

Singapore:

-Thai/US	Cobra Gold*
-Malaysia	Ex Malapura*
-Rep of Korea Navy, JMSDF, RAN, USN	Pacific Reach 2000
-USN, RAN	Tri Crab*
-RAAF, USAF	Tri Sling*
-WPNS	MCMEX/DIVEX
-US	CARAT*
-TNI-AU	Elang Indopura/Ex Camar Indopura
-TNI-AL	Joint Minex
-Brunei	Ex Bold Castle
-Aust.	Ex Wallaby*
-FPDA	Suman Warrior/
ADEX/STARDEX/Starfish*	
-RN	Ex Lion Heart
-RAAF	Ex Pitch Black*
-Canada Air Force	Ex Maple Flag*
-R Thai Navy	Ex Singsiam
-R Brunei Air Force	Ex Air Guard*
-Indian Navy	ASW ex -
Thai	Ex Kocha Singa
-RTAF ,USAF	Cope Tiger
-Sweden Navy	Legan Singa
-New Zealand Navy	Lion Zeal
-RMN, RNzN, RAN, RN, Papua	Kakadu

*   Biannual exercise

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1.   Adapted from Mak Jum Nam, "Malaysian Security Cooperation: Coming Out of the Closet", Paper delivered at the Evolving Approaches to Security in the Asia Pacific, 9-10 December 2002, Marina Mandarin, Singapore, organized by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore.
2.   Malaysian Armed Forces Website, accessed at
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ASEAN Cooperation on Terrorism

- Against the 'war on terrorism", ASEAN members during the 7th ASEAN Summit in 2001, issued an ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism which outlined several measures to fight terrorism. These included: deepening co-operation among front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing "best practices; enhancing information/intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on terrorists and terrorist organizations, their movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, property, and the security of all modes of travel, and others.

- Under the ASEAN framework, member states signed the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures on 7th May 2002 to promote cooperation in combating transnational crime, including terrorism. Similarly, ASEAN and the United States issued a Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism on 1 August 2002, which committed the US and all ten ASEAN members to improve intelligence- gathering efforts, strengthen capacity-building measures and enhance mutual cooperation.

- Given the close linkages between transnational crime and terrorism, provision of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and extradition agreements have been discussed within the framework of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime as tools to address this problems. This framework has been expanded to the ASEAN + 3 level with the first ASEAN + 3 Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC +3) held in Bangkok, Thailand in January 2004.

- As part of the continuing efforts to build capacity in fighting terrorism, the ASEAN region has seen the establishment of three complementary bodies: the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), and the international Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok.

- There have also been several activities undertaken under the auspices of the ARF. After the September 11 attacks, two workshops were held under the ARF Inter-Sessional Group (ISG) on Confidence Building Measures. The first was organised by Malaysia-U.S. Workshop on Financial Measures Against Terrorism held in Honolulu (24-25 Marcy 2002) and the Thailand-Australia Workshop on Prevention of Terrorism held in Bangkok on 17-19 April 2002. The recommendations of both meetings were adopted in the Statement of the 9th ARF Meeting in July 2002. Highlights of this meeting include:

  o The establishment of the Inter-sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC). To date this group has had two meetings, the latest one held in Manila on 30-31 March 2004 highlighted institutional and legal measures taken

> at the domestic level and recommendations to allow for domestic and international counter-terrorism measures to complement each other.
> - o Among these measures include blocking terrorist financing and looking at possible coordination with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATL).
> - o Enhancing measures to ensure transport security and enhancing Maritime Anti-Piracy and counter-terrorism cooperation. A series of measures to tackle the piracy problem have been identified. These included better information sharing, cooperation and training in anti-piracy measures, and the provision of technical assistance and capacity building to states in need of equipment, training and legal expertise. There are also plans to create a legal framework to combat piracy, calling for the adherence to the Rome Convention to prevent and suppress piracy incidents and a consideration of an IMB proposal to have prescribed traffic lanes for large super tankers on the high seas, wherever possible, with coast guard and naval escort.

Sources:
1. ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, 5 November 2001.
2. Joint Communiqué of the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 20-21 May 2002.
3. Co-Chairs' Statement on Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, Bali, 5 February 2004, accessed from http://www.aseansec.org/16001.htm.

Table 1: Types of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs*)*

Principles/ Declaratory Measures	-generalized statements of interests, norms, and beliefs -statements can be either explicit/formal (e.g., declarations, treaties) and implicit/informal (e.g., communiqués) -common to other approaches to security cooperation, e.g., preventive diplomacy (PD) or conflict resolution (CR)
Transparency measures	-defence White Papers publications -calendar of military activities -exchange of military information -military-to-military contacts -arms registry -military personnel/student exchanges -mandatory consultation on unusual/dangerous activities -notification of military manoeuvres/movements -invitation of observers -surveillance and control zones -open skies troop separation and monitoring
Constraining measures	-prevention of dangerous military activities -incidents at sea agreements -demilitarised zones -disengagement zones -air/maritime keep-out zones -weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zones -limits on personnel numbers, categories and deployment zones -limits on equipment deployment (by geographical area or numbers), category and storage -limits on troop and equipment movements/manoeuvres by size and geographical area -limits on readiness -limits on number of military exercises per year -bans on simultaneous exercises/alerts and/or certain force/unit types

Source:
Amitav Acharya, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Confidence-Building* [Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada, 1997])

Table 2: Multilateral CBMs in the ARF and CSCAP

Date	Development
1993	The ASEAN-PMC SOM discussed the following CBMs: information exchanges among defence officials, prior notification of military exercises, and ZOPFAN. SOM leaders stressed the need to develop regional dialogues and conduct research into CBMs applicable to the region.
1994	e ISG-CBMs in Australia (in November) proposed a multi-tiered framework for CBMs, based on likely time scales for implementation. In the short term, the ARF would focus on: promoting dialogue on security perceptions, enhancing military contacts at both senior and other levels (e.g., information and training exchanges), voluntary invitations of observers at military exercises, participation in the UN Conventional Arms Register (UNCAR), sea lanes of communication (SLOC) cooperation, etc. Over the medium term, ARF would explore the following: establishing a regional arms register, developing a regional security studies centre and coordinating security studies activities, cooperating in maritime information data bases and publishing defence White Papers. Over the long term, the ARF would extend such practices to include notification of major military deployment and maritime surveillance cooperation.
1995	ASEAN released a Concept Paper which proposed the following CBMs: explore the possibility of a regional arms register; establish a regional security studies centre and/or coordinate existing security studies activities; develop maritime information data bases; develop SLOC cooperation, beginning with information exchanges and training (in search and rescue, piracy and narcotics control, etc.); develop a humanitarian assistance mobilising mechanism for natural disasters; establish zones of cooperation (e.g., in the South China Sea); develop prior notification systems for major military deployments that have region-wide implications; and encourage arms producers and suppliers to reveal the destination of their exports. After meetings in October 1994 and May 1995, the CSCAP CSBM Working Group proposed the following CBMs: promote greater transparency in military doctrine, capabilities and intentions via contacts and exchanges among military establishments; intelligence exchanges; prior notification of military exercises; greater openness regarding defence planning, procurement and budgets, including the preparation of defence White Papers or reviews; increased military-military and military-civilian dialogues on security matters; develop a regional arms register, etc. It argued that formal CBM mechanisms modeled after Europe's OSCE are neither desirable nor feasible in this region. Instead, it advocated the unilateral and bilateral implementation of CBMs, and proposed that the ARF oversee the implementation of any multilateral initiatives. The 2nd ARF meeting held in Brunei formally adopted the following proposals from the Concept Paper: to keep the ARF as a forum for regional security dialogue, and to continue discussions on how best to implement CBMs. It convened an ISG-CBMs that focuses, inter alia, on a dialogue on security perceptions and voluntary submission of defence White Papers.
1996	At two meetings held in 1996, the ISG-CBMs agreed to maintain and further develop defence contacts and exchanges. They recommended to the forthcoming ARF SOM meeting in Indonesia the following: ARF to continue dialogue on security perceptions, including during ISG sessions; voluntary sharing of defence information by ARF members on dialogues and other activities; voluntary annual submissions of defence policy statements to the ARF, including White Papers, and the exchange of views given in those statements; opening the ARF SOM to defence officials and encouraging their greater participation in ISGs; encourage information and personnel exchanges among national defence colleges; ARF to maintain a current list of contact points, exchange information on the role of defence authorities in disaster relief (including convening an ISG on it),

	and voluntarily exchanging information on observer participation in and notification of military exercises. The above measures were approved at the 3rd ARF meeting in Jakarta on 23 July 1996.
1997	At the ISG-CBMs meeting, participants expressed satisfaction with the progress on CBMs, but emphasised that more work was needed on current and new CBMs in the ARF agenda. Several inter-sessional CBM-related activities were conducted: conference of heads of national defence colleges, disaster relief, search and rescue (SAR), etc. The meeting of national defence college heads emphasised the importance of cooperation in security education and research, and networking, faculty and student exchanges, publications exchanges, seminars and conferences on mutually agreed topics, in enhancing confidence-building. The SAR meeting noted the positive steps made by various ARF participants to implement recommendations by the 1st ISM SAR in 1996 to enhance greater SAR coordination and cooperation. It agreed to submit a list of SAR Training Centres (SARTRs) to ARF Ministers for endorsement, and to recommend a list of principles and objectives to the ARF SOM for consideration and adoption by the ARF.
1998	At the ISG in March, participants emphasised the need to continue focus on core military defence-related CBMs, but also to address non-military CBMs in accordance with the ARF's comprehensive security approach. They also addressed the overlap between CBMs and PD. It was agreed to recommend to the ARF SOM that the mandate for the ISG on CBMs be extended for the next inter-sessional year, based on the following developments: good progress made in exchanges on regional security perceptions at the ISG, SOM and ARF Ministerial levels; rapidly expanding numbers of high-level bilateral defence contacts; frequent defence training and exchanges; high level of ARF member participation in UNCAR; encouraging participation in global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes; voluntary submission of annual defence policy statements by several ARF members and good progress in voluntary development of defence White Papers.
1999	The 6th ARF meeting in Singapore agreed that ASEAN remains the driving force of the ARF process, and that the ARF would maintain its evolutionary approach as the process progresses, at a pace comfortable to all members and on the basis of consensus, from confidence-building to PD, and eventually to conflict resolution. It requested the ISG-CBMs to explore further the overlap between CBMs and PD.

The ISG-CBMs considered two lists or "baskets" of new CBMs for implementation in the near future. Basket 1 consists of: military medicine cooperation, building a multilateral communications network called "ARFNET," defence language schools conference, etc. Basket 2 consists of: ARF liaison with other regional fora, a 2nd ARF SOM and counter-narcotics/port interdiction seminar, preventing and combating illegal small arms trafficking, etc. New CBM proposals by China and the Maritime Specialists Officials Meeting (MSOM) were added to the two baskets. Other CBM-related activities under ISG-CBMs auspices were as follows: 3rd ARF Meeting of Heads of Defence Universities in Ulan Bator; ARF Professional Training Programme on China's Security Policy in Beijing; ARF Seminar on Law of Armed Conflict in Newcastle, etc. |
| 2000 | The 7th ARF meeting in Bangkok emphasised the importance of CBMs to the overall ARF process and agreed that such efforts be intensified. Ministers underscored CBMs as the foundation and primary focus of the ARF process. The meeting also took note of the ARF Track-II Expert Meeting on Pacific Concord in Moscow and continuing efforts to that end. There also was agreement to convene an ARF Expert Group on transnational crime in conjunction with the ISG-CBMs.

At the ISG-CBMs meeting held in Seoul, Korea from 1-3 November, participants attributed stability of regional security partly to cooperative arrangements that had contained the effects of economic and financial crisis, but agreed to strengthen the process of regional security dialogue and cooperation under the ARF. They welcomed positive developments in the Korean peninsula, Mekong sub-region, East Timor, and dialogue in the ASEAN-China SOM consultations on—as well |

	as the informal Track-II workshop on conflict management in—the South China Sea. They agreed that adoption of a regional Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China would contribute to peace and stability in the South China Sea. The overlap between CBMs and PD was explored.
2001	The ISG-CBMs in April held in Kuala Lumpur noted efforts to achieve progress on securing accession of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. It noted the reports of the following CBMs for consideration at the next ARF SOM: meetings of Heads of Defence Colleges/Institutions; 2nd seminar on Law of Armed Conflict; seminar on economic security for Asia Pacific in the first decades of the 21st century; an ARF Peacekeeping Seminar, etc. It was agreed that New Zealand would prepare a concept paper on maintaining a record of CBM activities.

The 8th ARF meeting in July held in Hanoi on 25 July affirmed CBMs as the foundation and main thrust of the ARF process. The Ministers noted the general utility of Expert Groups meetings (EGMs) on transnational crime, and endorsed the recommendation of the ARF SOM and ISG-CBMs to discuss transnational crime in alternative formats, e.g., ad hoc workshops, seminars and symposia. The ARF paper on the Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy as well as on Expanding the Role of the ARF chair were adopted.

The ISG-CBMs meeting in New Delhi in December 2001 focused on international terrorism and it was noted that conventions against terrorism would constitute a CBM. The meeting revised the proposed list of CBM activities, and reviewed draft papers on CBMs to be presented at the ARF SOM. It was agreed that preventative diplomacy would continue to be discussed by the ISG. |
| **2002** | The ISG-CBMs met in Hanoi in April.   The region was agreed to be stable, with positive developments in major power relations. It was noted that the COC constituted an important CBM, contributing to the stability of the region. Terrorism and transnational crime were agreed to be important issues. As terrorism dominated the agenda, it was noted PD would be discussed in the next ISG. CSCAP-IIR work done on PD was proposed as a useful reference for future work.
At the ARF meeting in July 2002 it was decided that the ISG should continue its work on CBMs, possibly exploring the overlap between CBMs and PD. Work done on terrorism was hailed as a milestone in the ARF's preventative role. |
| **2003** | The next ISG meeting was held in Vientiane in March 2003. The issue of terrorism remained of the utmost importance, and concern for the impact on the region discussed. The meeting took note of CBMs including a seminar held on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and a workshop on maritime security. A CBM Workshop on managing the consequences of terrorism was held in June in Darwin.

At the 10th ARF meeting in Phnom Penh workshops done on military and defense cooperation, as well as military logistics outsourcing support were also commended. At the meeting, satisfaction was expressed at the level of confidence and trust that had been developed under ARF auspices and with the activities in the overlapping areas between CBMs and preventive diplomacy that the ARF had begun to undertake. The significance of enhancing the role of the ARF chair in advancing the ARF process was underlined.

At the following ISG-CBM meeting held in Beijing from November 20-23, there was an in depth discussion on non-security issues. It was agreed that non-traditional security issues, including terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, money laundering and cyber crimes continued to pose a threat to the peace and prosperity of the region and should remain as one of the priorities of the ARF agenda. The importance of capability building, information sharing and intelligence exchanges among ARF participants was also stressed. |

2004	An ARF Workshop on Preventative Diplomacy was held in March 2004 in Tokyo. One session focused on the concrete measures toward implementation of preventative diplomacy, while another focused on the new perception of security, particularly, transnational problems. In the future it was suggested that the possibility of an ISG-PD be considered, in contrast to having existing ISG-CBMs cover PD.

The ISG on CBM held in April in Yangon saw the proposal of the following CBM topics for the ARF: regional cooperation in maritime security, alternative development, non-traditional security and civil-military operations. The meeting also reiterated the need to explore PD in the future.
At the 11th ARF meeting in Jakarta on 2 July 2004, the importance of the adopted "Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy" in guiding the ARF in its action and work in PD was stressed. It was noted that some of the concepts have been translated into actions. A paper on the "Guidelines for the operation of the ARF Experts and Eminent Persons" was adopted.

The first ISG-CBMs following the 11th ARF meeting was held in Phnom Pen on October 26-28 2004. The meeting took note of the following CBMs: the 8th ARF meeting of the head of defence colleges/ institutions, an ARF workshop on Alternative Development, a workshop on maritime security and a seminar on cyber terrorism. It was the view of some that these measures in themselves constitute preventive diplomacy. |
| **2005** | The second ISG-CBM meeting following the ARF meeting in Jakarta was held in February in Berlin/ Potsdam. Sympathy and solidarity for the tsunami victims was expressed, as well as support for an early warning system in the Indian Ocean. Disaster relief was accordingly a large focus on the ISG meeting. New CBMs for the intersessional year relating to the following topics were considered: cooperation for maritime security, cooperation in non-traditional security, peace arrangements, changes in the security perceptions and military doctrines of ARF members, cyber terrorism. PD was again agreed to be an important area for the ARF to move toward.

An ARF workshop on "Evolving changes in the Security Perceptions of the ARF countries" was held in Ulaanbataar, Mongolia from 21-22 June 2005. Among the agenda items discussed were security perceptions of the ARF participants, prospects for ASEAN security community and prospects for security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

In July 2005, the 12th meeting of the ARF was held in Vientiane. In regard to CBMs, the Ministers reviewed the above-highlighted efforts and urged the ISG to continue its work. The Ministers also agreed to establish the ISG on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy to replace the existing ISG-CBM. PD was agreed to be important, and the hope for concrete measures to be adopted was stressed.

The first ISG CBM/PD following the 12th ARF meeting was held in Hawaii over October 17-19, 2005. With regards to PD, a discussion regarding how to move further on the issue was discussed, with the following suggestions made: 1) tasking the ARF EEPs to examine how the ARF could implement PD, 2) tasking the ARF Units to undertake studies on PD, and 3) compiling a list of best practices. Recently implemented CBMs on missile defense, civil-military operations and cyber terrorism were also discussed and others proposed. |
| **2006** | The following ISG CBM/PD meeting was held in Manila on March 1-3, 2006. The meeting took note of several intersessional CBM efforts, including workshops on the following: cooperative maritime security, capacity building of maritime security, small arms and light weapons, and export control licensing. |

	The first plenary meeting of the ARF experts and eminent persons was held at Jeju Island, Republic of Korea from 29-30 June 2006. It was agreed that despite its progress, the ARF lacks some of the institutional structure and cohesion among members to respond effectively to regional security challenges and concerns. It was generally agreed that there was a need for the ARF to shift from a forum for discussion to more of an institution for implementation. Institutional issues discussed included enhancing the role of the ARF Chair, reexamining the leadership structure, creating a Secretariat and strengthening relations with other multilateral and regional organizations. At the subsequent ISG CBM/PD meeting in Bataam in November, CBMs including ARF seminars on cyber security, the role of Military and Civil Cooperation in the control of communicable diseases and energy security as well as an ISM on disaster relief were noted.
2007	The second meeting of the group of Experts and Eminent Persons was held in Manila from 5-6 February to discuss multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Multilateral security cooperation was considered to be the best approach to cope with the region's actual security challenges. Non-traditional security was also seen as offering opportunities for regional co-operation. At the second ISG CBM/PD meeting (following from the 13th ARF meeting) in Helsinki in March, CBM measures such as the ARF Maritime Security Shore Exercise, and the first ARF Peacekeeping Experts meeting were noted. A discussion on the working methods of the ARF, with a view of enhancing overall efficiency and streamlining procedures, was also held. At the 14th ARF meeting in Manila on 2 August 2007, the Terms of Reference of Friends of the ARF chair was adopted to extend further cooperation and support for the ARF chair in carry out its mandate. The conclusions of a study of best practices and lessons learned from other multilateral organizations in PD was welcomed with the results to be implemented by the ARF Unit.

Adapted from RSIS and Pacific Forum Report, "Joint Study on Best practices and Lessons Learned In Preventive Diplomacy", 2008.

Box I

Regional Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

Note:

PSI consists of more than 90 members, but the figure includes only those involved in the Asia-Pacific multilateral security processes